Reluctance to Engage in Accredited Investor Verification

Reluctance to Engage in Accredited Investor Verification | Andrew Abramowitz, PLLCRule 506(c), the provision arising out of the JOBS Act that enables companies to raise capital using general solicitation and advertising while still being exempt from SEC registration requirements, has always had the potential to revolutionize the capital raising process. With the ability of companies to connect easily with potential investors anywhere via the internet and social media, one could imagine a world where this supplants private placements under Rule 506(b), in which the investor base is, by definition, limited based on existing relationships with the company or its broker-dealer. While the use of Rule 506(c) has grown since enactment, it has nowhere near the usage rate of Rule 506(b). In 2017, Rule 506(c) offerings represented only 4% in dollar amount of all Regulation D offerings.

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The SEC Expands the Pool of Smaller Reporting Companies

The SEC Expands the Pool of Smaller Reporting CompaniesThe SEC has greatly expanded the number of public companies that can take advantage of the “scaled disclosure” provisions of Regulation S-K. Under these rules, smaller reporting companies have less onerous requirements that apply to their periodic filings. For example, smaller reporting companies do not need to include the lengthy Compensation Discussion and Analysis disclosure that larger companies do. Following the SEC’s recent action, the definition of “smaller reporting company” includes registrants with a public float of less than $250 million (up from $75 million), as well as registrants with annual revenues of less than $100 million for the previous year and either no public float or a public float of less than $700 million (previously, less than $50 million of annual revenues with no public float).

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The Presumed Sophistication of Accredited Investors

The Presumed Sophistication of Accredited InvestorsA recent Wall Street Journal article highlighted how sketchy brokers have been marketing problematic private placements to accredited investors. While the article focused on the brokers, I was struck by the identity of one of the investor victims noted in the article as having lost a lot of money: George Stephanopoulos, the ABC News anchor and former Clinton Administration official. I don’t mean to cause Mr. Stephanopoulos any further embarrassment by highlighting this here (though I’m guessing that the readership of my blog is far less than that of the Journal), but the fact that he was scammed is a useful illustration of the misguidedness of the accredited investor definition and associated rules.

The current definition of “accredited investor” under SEC rules essentially uses wealth as a proxy for sophistication, as an individual can qualify by either having an annual income of $200,000 or a net worth of $1 million not including the value of one’s primary residence. An offering made to all accredited investors does not have an information requirement, meaning the investors do not need to be provided with a similar level of disclosure that would be associated with a registered public offering.

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A Possible Change to the “Accredited Investor” Definition

Accredited InvestorSecurities offerings that are exempt from the SEC’s registration requirements often hinge on whether some or all of the investors are “accredited investors.” There are various categories of accredited investors for business entities, but for individuals, the categories relate to the investor’s annual income, net worth or whether the individual is a director or executive officer of the issuer.

The underlying policy of the current definition of accredited investors is that rich people (a term not used in the actual rules, obviously) can be assumed to have a level of financial sophistication such that they would conduct adequate due diligence before making an investment. Accordingly, accredited investors require less disclosure about proposed securities offerings. This assumption is, shall we say, not attuned to human reality. The obvious group of accredited investors that are not necessarily sophisticated is heirs and spouses of wealthy business people, who may have no background at all in finance and investment matters. But even for those accredited investors who have directly earned the money that grants them that status, plenty are in fields such as sports and entertainment where the particular skill that is remunerative to them has nothing to do with investing. Additionally, many white collar professionals such as doctors, engineers and even some attorneys may be highly educated, but they are not able to make heads or tails of a balance sheet and income statement. …

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Non-Attorney Ownership of Law Firms

Non-Attorney Ownership of Law Firms | Andrew Abramowitz, PLLCCarolyn Elefant, writing (sensibly) in Above the Law, argues in favor of loosening restrictions in the U.S. against ownership of law firms by non-attorneys. She focuses on the increasing need for small firms to partner with non-lawyer professionals and how the inability to compensate these professionals by sharing profits makes it unnecessarily difficult to function. Regardless of a firm’s reasons for wanting to bring in non-lawyer equity holders, it’s worth considering the policy rationale underlying the current restrictions.

The general fear is that non-lawyer equity holders would interfere with legal decisions that should be left to the lawyers. This is a reasonable concern. To take a concrete example, suppose I had an outside non-lawyer investor in my firm, and suppose further that I was advising a cash-poor startup company who was negotiating with an outside investor on terms that I found to be inadvisable for the client. Now, it would be in my pure financial interest (short-term anyway) to downplay my concerns and let the client proceed with the investment, since it would mean my firm would get paid. But I’m constrained by ethical obligations that require me to put the client’s interests first. If my firm’s investor, however, became aware of this issue, the investor would be expected to push me to withhold my sound advice to the client.

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What to Expect When You Ask Your Lawyer about a Different Legal Specialty

Corporate Transactional Law Practice | Andrew Abramowitz, PLLCGary Ross, another founder of a small corporate law firm, writes in Above the Law about how lawyers should handle client inquiries about areas of law outside their specialty. As Ross notes, this issue comes up far more for lawyers at small law firms than it does at big ones, where there is usually someone with appropriate seniority and expertise to weigh in.

Clients should definitely avoid the mindset that lawyers should be able to speak intelligently about the basics for every area of the law. Law school and the bar exam cover a lot of ground, but far from everything. There is no reason to expect that a randomly selected lawyer would be able to rattle off details about, say, import/export regulation or local liquor licensing requirements, if asked out of the blue. While there are still true generalists who practice in small towns, their actual knowledge base is limited to the types of matters that generally come up among citizens doing regular things, i.e., not derivatives regulation.

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The SEC Proposes Expanding the Pool of Smaller Reporting Companies

The SEC recently proposed greatly expanding the definition of “smaller reporting company” applicable to public companies that file reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (10-Ks, 10-Qs, etc.). As someone who has done most of my public company work for smaller reporting companies, I can confirm that this will be a huge regulatory relief for those companies who now fall under the definition. …

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The SEC’s Discussion of Risk Factors

The SEC's Discussion of Risk FactorsThe SEC recently issued a long concept release seeking public comment on ways to modernize Regulation S-K, the set of disclosure requirements used both for Securities Act registration statements like Form S-1 and Exchange Act reports like Form 10-K. (As a side note, the term “concept release” invariably brings to my mind concept albums by bands like Pink Floyd.) Given my (self-imposed) limit on the length of my blog posts, I will confine my discussion of the release for now to just one point: the SEC’s solicitation of comment on the suggestion that companies provide, in the Risk Factors section, estimated probabilities of the relevant event occurring and the magnitude of the effect on the company if it does occur.

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Legal Disclosure Requirements for Title III Crowdfunding

Before the SEC issued final rules recently relating to Title III crowdfunding – offerings of up to $1 million to accredited or non-accredited investors – there was much skepticism among the investment community whether these offerings could be completed in a cost effective manner, given the combination of a low offering limit and significant compliance requirements. The SEC addressed the concern in part by lifting the requirement that offerings over $500,000 be accompanied by audited financial statements, permitting reviewed statements in an issuer’s first crowdfunded offering. Another significant cost associated with these offerings is also how I make my living: legal disclosure requirements.

Equity Crowdfunding | Title III CrowdfundingFor comparison purposes, I think it would be useful to consider the requirements associated with the most common way to offer securities today in an exempt offering to non-accredited investors: a Rule 506(b) private placement. These offerings require the preparation of a disclosure document, the private placement memorandum (PPM), containing essentially the information required in a prospectus for a public offering. In other words, a lot of information, basically anything that the SEC has ever thought of requiring. Accordingly, a PPM is expensive to prepare.

For Title III crowdfunded offerings, the equivalent of the PPM will be a Form C. Although the form will be required to be filed electronically via EDGAR, which has its own associated costs, the form itself requires somewhat less information than a PPM. To take an example, Form C requires the disclosure of holders of 20% of the issuer’s stock, as opposed to the 5% threshold that would be used in a registered offering document and a PPM. Time will tell what becomes common practice for preparation of the Form C offering document, and they may contain more disclosure than is strictly required, but based on an initial read of the rules, it will be a simpler (and therefore cheaper to produce) document.
However, unlike issuers that rely on Regulation D, issuers who complete a crowdfunded offering will have an ongoing annual disclosure requirement, essentially an annual Form C with all of the same information, except for offering-related disclosure. This requirement, while significant, is far less onerous than the requirements imposed on public companies (quarterly and periodic filings, proxy statements, etc.).

It is difficult to predict whether issuers will find this process to be cost effective, and we will all find out through experience. One factor that may tip the balance in favor of crowdfunding, even with the compliance costs, is that investors will not likely require the onerous terms that sophisticated institutional investors impose on issuers in private offerings – liquidation preferences, anti-dilution provisions, etc.

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The Paternalistic Attitude Toward Prospective Law Students

Law School | Andrew AbramowitzThe law professor Noah Feldman writes in Bloomberg about the problem of marginally qualified law school graduates who fail to pass the bar exam and find themselves saddled with a huge amount of student loan debt. Since the financial crisis, there has been a cottage industry of articles and blog posts (and even more online comments to those pieces) arguing that if you can’t get into a top law school, you’re essentially throwing away your money by going to a less competitive one. Feldman rightly notes that it’s paternalistic to urge less competitive law schools not to admit people who, statistically, are less likely to succeed based on LSAT scores. As long as students have a clear-eyed sense of the risks involved, then a law school shouldn’t be telling an ambitious kid with a 148 LSAT score to try another career.

The problem, however, which I don’t think Feldman sufficiently addresses, is that many prospective law students in fact don’t have an accurate sense of the risks involved. You don’t have to be overly cynical to acknowledge that law schools have an incentive to make it seem as if their graduates have a bright future and will downplay these risks, so as to collect three years of tuition. One example is the statistic about percentage of graduates employed after graduation, which affects the law school’s rankings. Following the financial crisis and decline in available entry-level legal jobs, many schools took steps to place their not-yet-employed graduates in non-profit and government positions as a bridge to eventual private sector employment. While these temporary positions may end up being valuable experiences for the graduates, it isn’t the outcome they necessarily expected entering law school. Put another way, when a prospective student sees that a law school has a post-graduation employment rate of, say, 90%, which sounds good, they are not necessarily aware that some significant portion of those employed are not employed in the career path the student is hoping to take.

So, while I don’t think it’s reasonable to tell a less-competitive law school that they should refuse to admit students below a certain LSAT cut-off, or who are otherwise statistically likely to find it difficult to make it in a competitive law marketplace, I do think they have an obligation to ensure that their students have a clear sense of what they’re getting into before they write their first tuition check or sign onto a student loan arrangement. If the schools are not able to meet this obligation, it should be imposed on them, either via regulation or the widespread adoption of a third party assessment of the post-graduate performance of each school that tells the true story of what a student could expect and isn’t as subject to gaming as the current rankings.

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